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MUNICIPAL HOME-RULE IN COLORADO
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I. INTRODUCTION

Probably no problem in Colorado is of greater importance than
the home-rule city.1 At a recent date there were twenty-two homerule cities in the state. 2 The number continues to increase. Until
4
3
recently only one of the larger cities was a "general statute" city.
The population growth in metropolitan areas since World War
II marks a revolutionary change in our national characteristics. The
problems arising from this population shift are wide and varied.
Local governments are hard pressed to meet the demands for additional municipal services and to meet the cost of defraying them.
The financial woes of municipalities, school districts, and other political subdivisions in heavily populated urban areas are commonplace.
Problems encountered in home-rule cities involve a wide range of
municipal matters.

II.

CONFLICTING THEORIES

OF GOVERNMENT

Home-rule is an outgrowth of a desire for independence, and
self-determination. As a general rule, a municipality is a creature of
*In the preparation of this paper, the author is indebted to the authors of a number of papers
and published articles, as well as to several of the attorneys in the firm in which he is a partner.
Particularly, the assistance of his partner, Thomas B. Faxon, should be noted.
1 Colo. Const., art. XX § 6, provides in part that, "The people of each city or town of this state,
are hereby vested with . . . power to make,
having a population of two thousand inhabitants ...
amend, add to or replace the charter of said city or town, which shall be its organic law and extend
to all its local and municipal matters."
2 Alamosa, Boulder, Canon City, Colorado Springs, Cortez, Craig, Delta, Denver, Durango, Englewood, Fort Collins, Fort Morgan, Grand Junction, Greeley, Lafayette, Littleton, Monte Vista, Montrose,
Pueblo, Sterling, Westminster and Wray.
3 Greeley.
4The rapid population growth in metropolitan Denver in the lost ten years has altered this
picture. Arvoda, Aurora, and Thornton have grown to become relatively large municipalities and
they are not home-rule cities.
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the legislature and has no inherent powers. This fundamental rule
has been expressed as follows:
It is a general and undisputed proposition of law that a
municipal corporation possesses and can exercise the following powers, and no others: First, those granted in express words; second, those necessarily or fairly implied in,
or incident to, the powers expressly granted; third, those
essential to the accomplishment of the declared objects and
purposes of the corporation ....

Any fair, reasonable, sub-

stantial doubt concerning the existence of power is resolved
by the courts against the corporation, and the power is
denied.5
Further, courts generally adopt a rule of strict construction of
municipal powers to determine if there is any reasonable doubt
about the existence of a power and if it is actually non-existent. The
rationale for these rules of construction is that the legislature intended to grant only those powers which it expressly granted or
which are necessarily or incidentally implied. 6 Frequently, this
dependence upon a state legislature has been frustrating to large
numbers of persons in whom the drive for independence is strong.
Home-rule for municipalities has been practiced for many years,
both in this country and in England. One writer describes cities
in England having rights of home-rule prior to Magna Charta. The
5 1 Dillon, Municipal Corporations 1 237 (5th ed. 1911). To the same effect, see 2 McQuillin,
Municipal Corporations HI 10.03-.12 (3d ed. 1949); 1 Jones, Bond and Bond Securities § 36 (4th ed.
1935); 1 Yokley, Municipal Corporations § 52 (1956); Rhyne, Municipal Low of 4-2, 4-7 (1957); 1
Antieau, Municipal Corporation Law § 5.01 (1958).
6 2 McQuillin, Municipal Corporations §§ 10.18-.19 (3d ed. 1949). See also I Dillon, Municipal
Corporations §§ 237-39 (5th ed. 1911); 1 Antieau, Municipal Corporation Low § 5.03 (1958); 1
Yokely, Municipal Corporations § 60 (1956).
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same writer cites the Great Charter of the City of London as granting powers of self-government. The earliest home rule provision in
this country, however,
dates from a constitutional amendment by
7
Missouri in 1875.
III. TYPES OF HOME-RULE
As is indicated above, there is considerable variation from state
to state in theories of home-rule. Some basic classification of the
theories is, however, possible.
There are two basic theories or approaches to the problems of
municipal home-rule power and legislative control. The "constitutional" or "self-executing" theory is that a municipality has all
powers over its local and municipal affairs.8 This extreme view followed in Arizona, California, Colorado and Oklahoma denies all
legislative control of municipal affairs, and invalidates legislative
acts on such matters even if there is no municipal legislation in
point.9 The more common, and less extreme, view results in the
invalidation of legislative acts affecting municipal affairs only when
the conflict is with a municipal charter or ordinance. 10
In the non-self-executing or "legislative" states, a municipality
is still dependent upon the state legislature for its powers. The
courts, however, generally adopt a rule of liberal construction in
their interpretations of legislation. Enabling acts are frequently required, although many of these acts constitute broad general grants
of power. In some jurisdictions special legislative charters are permitted."
Nevertheless, practically all jurisdictions, both "self-executing"
and "legislative" in theory, indicate that in matters not pertaining
solely to local and municipal matters, but which also are of "statewide concern," or "of general concern to the people of the state,"
municipal charters and ordinances are superseded when in conflict
with a legislative act. 12 Numerous problems exist as to what matters
are of state-wide concern, what constitutes a "conflict," and when
has the state "preempted" or "occupied the field." Although there
is a considerable body of case law distinguishing municipal affairs
from state affairs, no clear objective test emerges.
In distinguishing municipal affairs from state affairs, four broad
generalizations have been made. 13 First, if it appears that
uniform regulation of the matter in question is necessary or desirable for the state as a whole, the matter is usually found to be one
of state-wide concern. Secondly, historical considerations have some
effect in determining whether a particular subject is of local or statewide concern. Thirdly, and most important, is the relative effect of
the subject upon those people living outside the city in question. If
the effect of the matter is of minor significance to those urban
dwellers, the subject is usually deemed to be of local concern. The
courts, however, generally hold that a matter is of state concern if it
vitally affects many of those living outside the home-rule city. Finally, where uniformity as well as co-operation among many govern7
8
9
10
11
12
13

1 Antieau, Municipal Corporation Law § 3.00 (1958).
Id. 8 3.03.
Id. 6 3.14.
Id. § 3.15.
14. 4 308.
Id. 8 3.16.17.
Id. 9 3.36.
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mental units is necessary, and action of state and county officials is
required within the city to effectuate adequate protection outside
the city, the matter will most likely be considered to be of state-wide
concern. It is necessary for the courts to keep an open mind in
determining these questions and to avoid ruling in a particular way
merely because of precedents established many years before. The
courts should not hastily determine these questions, but should
thoroughly evaluate the effects upon the entire state, the people
living around the city, and those living within the city.
There are at least two "models" to which states can look for guidance as to home-rule theories and which express the divergent
theories suggested above. The National Municipal League (N.M.L.)
model was published in 1948 in the fourth edition of the Model State
Constitution. It sets forth the powers of home-rule municipalities in
broad general terms, with specific enumeration of certain powers,
without thereby limiting or restricting the general grant of municipal power. The legislature's power, however, to enact laws of statewide concern uniformly applicable to every city is not restricted.
The provision does create a self-executing imperium in imperio, a
realm of home-rule power in local and municipal affairs, partially
enumerated, which is not subject to legislative grace or tolerance.
This provision of the N.M.L. gives the municipalities a measure
of protection from a legislature controlled by the rural districts. The
provision is subject to the disadvantage that courts have a considerable burden in the case of conflicting state and municipal legislation
to decide
which matters are municipal affairs and which are state
14
affairs.
The model of the American Municipal Association (A.M.A.) was
printed in 1953 under the title Model Constitutional Provisions for
Municipal Home Rule. A home-rule city thereunder has a plenary
grant of powers in municipal affairs, effective without the aid of
enabling legislation except to the extent any power is not denied by
the city's charter, is not denied to all home-rule municipalities by
statute, and is within such limitations as may be established by
statute.
Unlike the theory in many "legislative" home-rule jurisdictions,
the existence of any power is not dependent upon an enabling act.
Nevertheless, a home-rule city is subject to control by the legislature - if the legislature affirmatively limits power without discrim14 Bromage, Home Rule - NML Model, 44 Nat'l Munic. Rev. 132 (1955).
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ination. The advantage of this model of the A.M.A. lies in the fact
that it avoids the necessity of repeated court determinations of what
constitute municipal affairs and what constitute general affairs,
determinations which place a considerable burden on the courts and
which have defied "reasonably predictable application because of its
(the distinction between municipal and state affairs) lack of a firm
rational core." The disadvantage, if it be such, is that, with certain
exceptions,"5 no home-rule power is beyond legislative control, even
in an area which almost any court would hold to be solely of local
and municipal concern.' 6

IV.

INCEPTION OF HOME-RULE IN COLORADO

The Colorado Supreme Court recently stated that in construing
a constitutional provision, "its particular meaning depends not alone
on definitions but also on the history of the amendment as a whole,
including the intent of the framers;17the context in which it appears,
together with the applicable facts.'
Local self-determination in Denver, among white settlers in
Cclorado, had its origin in the mining "districts" and the agricultural
and urban "claim-clubs," created as early as 1859 with the initial
gold rush in Colorado, and as late as 1880. Few, however, were
created after 1861 when the Colorado Territory was effectively
launched under federal authority, and few failed to surrender their
law-making and enforcement powers to territorial officials. These
"districts" and "claim-clubs," however, filled a vacuum existing between 1859 to 1861 and were in a real sense autonomous local governments operating without any legislative grants of power.'8
Denver was incorporated by a special act of the Legislative
Assembly of the Territory of Colorado, entitled "An Act To Incorporate the City of Denver," adopted and approved on November 7,
1861. This act or charter was amended a number of times by subsequent sessions of territorial and state legislatures.
The author of the "Rush Amendment" to the Colorado Constitution, i.e., article XX, sometimes called the "home-rule amendment," wrote a book in which he describes the turbulent history of
the birth of home-rule in Colorado. 19 Many pages are devoted to the
tribulations leading to the sentiment that home-rule was necessary
to rescue control of the cities, particularly Denver, from the rurallycontrolled General Assembly. In the 1880's, the situation was such
that control of Denver was a political football. Many persons believed the City of Denver had been reduced to political serfdom.
So intolerable had conditions become that the people of Denver began to demand home-rule. A citizen's party managed to elect a nonpartisan mayor in 1895 and again in 1897; but he was defeated in
1899, allegedly by nefarious means.
Many charges of graft and coruption were hurled at the county
officials. Judge Ben B. Lindsey, then on the county bench, unearthed proof of these charges. Another source of irritation was the
15 The A.M.A. model restricts the state's legislative power as to municipal procedures by making
"chorter" provisions superior to statutes.
16 Fordhom, Home Rule - AMA Model, 44 Nat'l Munic. Rev. 137 (1955).
17 Board of Education v. Spurlin, 349 P.2d 357,361 (Colo. 1960).
18 Rogers, The Beginning of Law in Colorado, 36 Dictn 111 (1959).
19 Rush, The City-County Consolidated 328-32 (1940). This book is unfortunately relatively rare
and is not readily available.
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unequal taxation for the five different school districts which were
either wholly of partially within the
20 city limits of Denver. Attempts
to consolidate these districts failed.
Dissatisfaction was also expressed for the alleged mis-handling
of the city council's powers in awarding franchises to public utility
corporations. Corrupt bargaining was openly charged.
Several abortive attempts were made in 1898 and again in 1899
to correct these problems. In 1901, Mr. Rush, the author of the above
books, as a state senator introduced a bill for an amendment to the
constitution which would add article XX for purposes of creating a
City and County of Denver as a new political entity in the state. The
people and leading newspapers rallied to the support of the proposed amendment. On the other hand, the public utilities and other
newspapers came out in vicious opposition to the proposal. After a
bitter struggle, the legislature voted to submit the proposed amendment to a vote of the people in November of 1902. In that election,
the amendment carried by more than a two-to-one majority.
Immediately upon the amendment's going into effect in 1902, its
beneficial results became apparent. Taxes were materially reduced,
the dual set of officers was -eliminated, official responsibility was
was obviated and the governmental operfixed, conflict in authority
21
ations were simplified.

It seems equally clear, however, that the author of article XX
did not intend a home-rule city to be completely independent of the
state legislature. He stated in his book:
It seems clear ...

that the City and County of Denver

is a 'single body politic and corporate,' with one set of
officers to perform both city and county functions . . .
All that the legislature may do is to pass general laws
prescribing what acts and duties county officers must perform, but in no event has it any power to authorize the
governor or any other person to name a single one of such
officers. That was the deliberate purpose of the author in
drafting article XX so as to leave the legislature that limited
to the proper exercise of the sovereign
power necessary only
22
power of the state.
In Denver, pursuant to the constitutional amendment, the first
charter convention was elected and a proposed charter was framed
in 1903. The utility companies in Denver, however, voiced strong opposition to the charter. The proposed charter was not passed. A
second charter convention was elected, and the charter framed by
it was adopted by the electors on March 29, 1904. It was much like
the proposed charter of 1903. The provisions concerning the acquisition of privately-owned utilities by Denver were so burdensome and
complex that as a practical matter it was not feasible to follow them.
In 1917, the acquisition of the Denver Union Water Company
properties and water system was authorized by a separate charter
amendment.
The voters of Colorado Springs adopted a home-rule charter by
authority of article XX on May 11, 1909; Grand Junction, on Sep20 In re Senate Bill No. 9,26 Colo. 136, 56 Pac. 173 (1899); In re Senate Bill No. 23, 23 Colo.
499, 48 Pac. 647 (1897).
21 Rush, co cit. supra note 19, at 337, 339-40.
22 Id. at 351. (Emphasis Added).
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tember 14, 1909; and Pueblo, on July 28, 1911. These three cities and
Denver were the pioneers in home-rule in its first decade in Colorado.
V.

PROVISION OF ARTICLE XX

In summary, article XX as adopted in 1902, provided that the
"municipal corporation known as the city of Denver, and all municipal corporations and that part of . . . the county of Arapahoe ...

included within the exterior boundaries of the said city of Denver...
are hereby consolidated and are hereby declared to be a single body
politic and corporate, by the name of the 'City and County of Denver'." There follow several powers2 3 which are like those typically
granted by state legislatures to cities which are creatures of the
legislatures, e.g., the powers . . . to sue and defend, have a seal,

receive and manage gifts and bequests, acquire utilities and issue
bonds. It was provided that the united city and county should grow
as a unit under the general annexation statutes; and that the City
and County of Denver should alone constitute school district No. 1,
the school district to be governed under the general laws of the
state, with
automatic merger in the district of lands annexed to
24
Denver.
Article XX also provided that Denver's officers should be those
provided by charter, which should designate the officers to perform
acts and duties required by the constitution or general law, "as far
as applicable. '25 The amendment provided for the transfer of government and for interim officers. 26 Article XX stated that the people
of Denver "are hereby vested with and they shall always have the
exclusive power in the making, altering, revising or amending their
charter," and the taxpaying electors shall be elected to a charter
convention to draft a charter to be submitted to the people.2 7 No
franchise relating to any street, alley or public place of Denver can
be granted without the approval of taxpaying electors. The council
has the power to fix the rate of taxation on property each year for
2
city and county purposes.
A procedure was provided for the amend29
ment of a charter.
Section 6, article XX, before its amendment in 1912, provided
that cities of the first and second class in the state were empowered
to adopt charters and to have the same power as provided in article
XX.
The last section of article XX proides that "anything in the constitution of this state in conflict or inconsistent with the provision
of this amendment is hereby declared to be inapplicable to the matters and things by this amendment covered and provided for." 30
23 This article, in line with the language of the constitution and of most of the charters, speaks
of "powers" and "authority." Where, however, the question has been squarely presented, it aenerally has been held that the home-rule charters, as well as constitutional provisions, constitute limitations on power and are not in fact grants of power. Thus, it has been held that Article XX confers
upon the City and County of Denver all necessary powers in local and municipal matters which the
legislature could validly grant; and, unless otherwise limited, these powers may be exercised
through the legislative department of the city. Laverty v. Straub, 110 Colo. 311. 134 P.2d 208 (19431:
People ex rel. McQuaid v. Pickens, 91 Colo. 109, 12 P.2d 349 (1932). See also Hawkins v. Hunt, 113
Colo. 468, 160 P.2d 357 (1945).
24 Colo. Const., art. XX, iI 1,7.
25 Colo. Const., art. XX, § 2.
26 Colo. Const., art. XX, § 3.
27 Colo. Const., art. XX.
4.
28 Colo. Const., art. XX, 11.
29 Colo. Const., art. XX, 5.
30 Colo. Const., art. XX, 8.
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VI. LEGISLATIVE HISTORY IN THE FIRST DECADE

Within a month after its adoption, article XX was under attack
in the courts. The tenor of Mr. Rush's remarks indicates that emotions ran high, that vitriolic remarks were publicly made, and that
intrigue and activity concerning
there was a great deal of political
31
Denver's home-rule powers.
On December 1, 1902, the newly-proclaimed treasurer of the
City and County of Denver demanded of the treasurer of the old
City of Denver, who refused to be displaced, that the latter give
him all moneys, records and property belonging to the office of city
treasurer. This demand was denied, and the new treasurer sought a
writ of mandamous commanding the transfer. The answer asserted
the unconstitutionality of the mode of amendment and of its substantive content. The final decision, in People v. Sours, 2 upheld
article XX in its entirety. This decision included a thirty-page opinion by Mr. Justice Steele, a separate concurring opinion, and a dissent by Mr. Justice Campbell which was as long as the majority
opinion.
In the court's opinion, Mr. Justice Steele wrote that "the amendment is to be considered as a whole in view of its expressed purpose
freedom from legislaof securing to the people of Denver absolute 33
tive interference in matters of local concern.
Then, in 1905, eight cases 34 arose involving the title to the
31
32
33
34

Rush, op. cit. supra note 19 at 341-51.
31 Colo. 369, 74 Poc. 167 (1903).
Id. at 387, 74 Pac. at 172.
People v. Johnson, 34 Colo. 143, 86 Pac. 233 (1905). The other seven cases follow in 34 Colo.
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offices in Denver of county judge, county assessor, county clerk and
recorder, treasurer, constable, sheriff, county commissioners and
justices of the peace. Fifteen hundred pages of briefs and arguments
were filed in the Colorado Supreme Court by a great bank of attorneys on each side.
The court held invalid the Denver charter provisions relative
to election and term of office of these persons who would perform
the "county" jobs in the home-rule city and county. These matters,
the court held, were governed by general statute.
This decision was in the face of section 2 of article XX of the
Colorado Constitution, which provided then, as it does today, that
"the officers of the City and County of Denver shall be such as by
appointment or election may be provided for by the charter; and
the jurisdiction, term of office and qualifications of all such officers
shall be such as in the Charter may be provided; but the charter
shall designate the officers who shall, respectively, perform the acts
and duties required of county officers to be done by the Constitution
or by the general law, as far as applicable."
Mr. Justice Steele and one other dissented, stating that it was
held in positive language in Sours, not only that the people could,
but that they had freed Denver from several provisions 35
of the constitution by making article XX a part of the constitution.
These eight cases relating to county officers were all overruled
six years later in the Cassiday36 case... Mr. Justice Steele's dissent
in the earlier "officer cases" was adopted in toto by the majority in
Cassiday. The court said in substance:
Article XX is as much a part of the constitution as
any other. There is provision (under section 2) clearly providing for the appoirtment and election of such officers
of the City and County of Denver as may be provided by
the Charter. There is no room for construction. There is in
Denver a county government and a city government, just as
in other portions of the state. There is no pretense in the
Charter of setting aside governmental duties as to state and
county affairs; the Charter, pursuant to the Constitution,
37
simply provides by whom the duties shall be performed.
While Cassiday was held to be a great victory for Denver, it
was followed by two cases in quick succession which again showed
an extremely restrictive attitude toward home-rule. In the first of
these,3 8 the court held that there was no authority vested in the City
and County of Denver to control and fix in any way the levy of
taxes for county purposes within its boundaries. This was apparently
directly contrary to article XX which expressly says "The council
shall have power to fix the rate of taxation on property each year
35 Id. at 188, 86 Pac. at 247. For an interesting sidelight involving contempt proceedings brought
against the publisher of a newspnoer which bitterlv criticized the Johnson case, see Peoole v. NewsTimes Publishing Co., 35 Colo. 253, 84 Pac. 912 (1906), aff'd, sub non Patterson v. Colorado, 205
U.S. 454 (1907).
•36People v. Cassiday, 50 Colo. 503, 117 Pac. 357 (1911). Cases intervening between the 1905
"officer cases" and Cossiday were: Glendenning v. The City and County of Denver, 50 Colo. 240,
114 Pac. 652 (1911); Keefe v. The People, 37 Cola. 317, 87 Pac. 791 (1906); City of Denver v. Hallett,
34 Colo. 393, 83 Pac. 1066 (1905).
3T Mr. Rush's remarks concerning she alleged "most astounding theft of the legislative, executive
and judicial branches of on entire state without parallel in history" during the period between the
dates the Sours and Cossiday decisions were rendered, as well as his rather vitriolic comments concerning a number of the judicial decisions rendered in that pecriod
and their authors, indicate considerable political turmoil. Rush, op. cif. supra note 19, at 344 et seq.
38 Hilts v. Markey, 52 Colo. 382, 122 Pac. 394 (1912).
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for city and county purposes." The court said however, that the
provision applied only to purposes of the consolidated unit. What is
meant by a "consolidated unit" is not clear. The case is unquestionably one difficult to understand. Then came the last straw. In the
Mauff 9 case, the selection of judges for municipal elections was held
to be a matter of state-wide concern on which there could be no
legislation by the people of Denver. Mr. Justice Teller said several
years later that "It is common knowledge that the decision [in
Mauff] was the moving
cause of the framing and initiating of the
0
Amendment of 1912."4
It was in November of 1912 that article XX was amended- to
add the forceful section 6. Reference is made to "Dillon's rule,"
stated above, 41 that a municipal corporation has only those powers
granted in express words, those necessarily or fairly implied in the
powers expressly granted, and those essential to the accomplishment
of the declared objects of the corDoration which are not merely convenient, but indispensable. So far, the Colorado Supreme Court,
at least some of the time, has made it clear that article XX completely freed the home-rule City of Denver from this mandate in local
and municipal matters.
The "reluctant" cases, however, culminated in the substantial
amendment of section 6, article XX, to read in part as follows:
(T) he

-harter of such city or town . . . shall be its

organic law and extend to all its local and municipal matters.
Such charter and the ordinances made pursuant thereto
in such matters shall supersede within the territorial limits
and other jurisdiction of said city or town any law of the
state in conflict therewith .... 42
Powers granted by this amendment included the powers of the
home-rule city "to legislate upon, provide, regulate, conduct and
control:"
a. Municipal officers and agencies.
b. Police courts and magistrates.
c. Municipal courts and magistrates.
d. Municipal elections.
39 Mouff v. People,
40 City and County
610 (1919).
41 See text at note
42 Colo. Const., art.

52 Colo. 562, 123 Pac. 101 (1912).
of Denver v. Mountain States Tel. & Tel. Co., 67 Colo. 225, 238, 184 Pac. 604,
5.
XX, § 6.

SAVING MONEY NEVER GOES OUT OF STYLE
Economical Office Space Immediately Available
in the ZOOK BUILDING
Put savings in your own pocket!
Barbershop o Bank o Snackbar in Building Complex
In and Out Parking-$7.50 per month
-and tenants receive one red stamp for every dollar paid
Contact Dean Zook
Zook Building
431 W. Colfax
AC. 2-8953

DICTA

JULY-AUGUST

1960

e. Municipal bonds and elections.
f. Municipal park and water districts.
g. Assessment and collection of municipal taxes.
h. Enforcement and collection of fines for violations of municipal regulations.
After the enumeration of the above powers, the following broad
provisions were added as if to remove any doubt of the over-all
scope of home-rule powers:
It is the intention of this article to grant and confirm to
the people of all municipalities coming within its provisions
the full right to self-government in both local and municipal
matters and the enumeration herein of certain powers shall
not be construed to deny such cities and towns, and to the
people thereof, any right or power essential or proper to
the full exercise of such right.
The statutes of the state of Colorado, so far as applicable, shall continue to apply to such cities and towns,
except in so far as superseded by the charters of such cities
and towns or by ordinance passed pursuant to such charters.
All provisions of the charters of the city and county of
Denver and the cities of Pueblo, Colorado Springs and
Grand Junction ...

not in conflict with this article, and all

elections and electoral votes heretofore had under and
pursuant thereto, are hereby ratified, affirmed and validated
as of their date ....

43

Section 6 also made provision for municipalities other than
Denver to become home-rule cities. Such cities are granted "the
powers set out in Sections 1, 4 and 5 of this Article," as well as those
otherwise stated in Section 6.
The major battle was won, at least for a time. The eight
specific items presumably governed all the areas which the proponents of Section 6 thought had proven or were likely to prove troublesome. The Colorado Supreme Court readily upheld the adoption of
the amendment, and in so doing, noted that if any of the matters
specifically enumerated
in Section 6 were not of local concern be44
fore, they are now.

The first of those eight specified powers is that to legislate upon,
provide, regulate, conduct and control the creation and terms of
municipal officers. In this area, it is now fairly clear that Cassiday
is the rule, that is, the home-rule city can provide for the selection
and term of the officer to do the job, whether the functions are
properly specified by the state legislature or by the council. Thus,
a charter provision for the manager of safety to issue liquor licenses
prevails over the statute providing
that the issuance shall be by
45
the council of a city and county.
But this right of selection has not been left unqualified. It cannot stand in the way of the performance of a function of a statewide nature. Thus, where Denver had not appointed her own registrar
of vital statistics and the legislature had provided for a dis48 Ibid.
44 People v. Prevost, 55 Colo. 199, 134 Poc. 129 (1913).
45 Reed v. Blakely, 115 Colo. 559, 176 P.2d 68 (1946).
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trict covering Denver, Denver could be
4 6 compelled under the
statute to pay the state appointee's salary.
Another of the specific powers provided in Section 6, article
XX, is "the assessment of property in such city or town for municipal
taxation and the levy and collection of taxes thereon for municipal
purposes and special assessments for local improvements." This
clearly met the troublesome "county purpose" tax case 47 which had
been decided immediately before the amendment.
It does not mean, however, that the state cannot require the
Denver treasurer, along with all other county treasurers, to make
certificates as to special assessments due, at least in the absence of
conflicting charter or ordinance provisions.4 The court has also held
that a general statute exempting cemeteries from assessments is
declarative of the public policy of the state and may not be superseded by ordinance. 49 In this case, the 1912 amendment was ignored
and the repudiated Mauff case was cited as authority.
The Tihen case is difficult to follow. Measured by the tests suggested by Antieau,50 the subject matter seems to be solely of local
and municipal concern. Any peculiar desirability of uniform regulation is absent. Historical considerations suggest no general concern.
The effect on people outside the city would be negligible. There is
no necessity for cooperation among governmental units. The history
of article XX, including but not limited to the amendment of Section 6 thereof, indicates that the people desired a liberal attitude by
the courts in finding matters to be of local and municipal concern;
and, conversely, a conservative attitude in finding a matter to be of
state-wide concern. Further, Section 6, article XX, specifically provides that a home-rule city has the "power to legislate upon, provide, regulate, conduct and control ...

the levy and collection of...

special assessments for local improvements." If it be conceded that
that matter is of state-wide concern, a decision that the conflicting
ordinance was superseded by the statute exempting the cemetery
property from the levy of a special assessment would be sound. But
the statement that the city has no power in a matter of state-wide
concern, at least in the absence of a legislative delegation of power,
46 Hershey v. McNichols, 91 Colo. 141, 13 P.2d 266 (1932).
47 Hilts v. Morkey, 52 Colo. 382, 122 Pac. 394 (1912).
48 City and County of Denver v. Highlander Boy Foundation, 102 Colo. 365, 79 P.2d 361 (1938).
49 City and County of Denver v. Tihen, 77 Colo. 212, 235 Pac. 777 (1925). In the area of special
assessments, see also County Comm'nrs v. City of Colorado Springs, 66 Colo. 111, 180 Pac. 301 (1919);
Londoner v. City and County of Denver, 52 Colo. 15, 119 Pac. 1956 (1912).
50 1 Antieau, Municipal Corporation Law § 3.36 (1958). See text at note 13.
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totally ignores the historical reasons for and the inferences created
by the 1912 amendment of Section 6, article XX. The court places
emphasis upon the Mauff case as precedent for its decision, but the
dissatisfaction with the Mauff decision precipitated the 1912 amendment of Section 6.
Statutory,51 and even constitutional 52 provisions which, by
their terms, regulate or limit the issuance of bonds have been held
not to be applicable to the issuance of bonds by home-rule cities.
The last of the eight express powers, herein mentioned, is
that for the imposition, enforcement and collection of fines and
penalties for the violation of any of the provisions of the charter
or ordinances. The section additionally provides that any act in
violation of the provisions of a city's charter or any ordinance thereunder shall be criminal and punishable as such when so provided
by any statute now or hereafter in force.
The narrow holding of the Merris case 5 3 is that since there is
a statute which makes driving under the influence of intoxicating
liquor a crime, its counterpart in the municipal laws of Canon City
must be tried and punished as a crime. 54 The proper procedure
where there is no state statute is not yet entirely clear.55
Section 6 of article XX makes it clear that the enumeration
therein is by no means exclusive. Nor has there been any suggestion
in the cases since 1913 that beyond the named powers, there are
only those necessarily implied. It is true that since 1913, particularly in areas other than those enumerated in article XX, the court
has tended to hold state legislation applicable to home-rule cities
on the theory of state-wide concern, 56 even though there may be
a conflicting local provision. 57 One exception to this is the well51 Newton v. City of Fort Collins, 78 Colo. 380, 241 Pac. 114 (1925).
52 Montgomery v. City and County of Denver, 102 Colo. 427, 80 P.2d 434 (1938); Clough v. City
of Colorado Springs, 70 Colo. 87, 197 Poc. 896 (1921). Consistent with Clough is City and County of
Denver v. Mountain States Tel. & Tel. Co., 67 Colo. 225, 184 Pac. 604 (1919). This holding has since
been nullified because the regulation of a telephone company with properties in numerous municipalities and unincorporated areas was found to be of state concern in People ex rel. Public Utilities
Comm'n v. Mountain States Tel. & Tel. Co., 125 Colo. 167, 243 P.2d 397 (1952). Cases which lend
support to the proposition that constitutional provisions existing prior to, as well as after, the enactment of article XX, constitute limitations on the exercise of local legislative power of home-rule cities
are- Berger v. City and County of Denver, 350 P.2d 192, 194 (Colo. 1960) (equal protection of laws
in overtime parking traffic violation); City and County of Denver v. Sweet, 138 Colo. 41, 329 P.2d
441 (1958) (Denver income tax case involving constitutional amendment subsequent to art. XX, (Sec.) 6);
City of Canon City v. Merris, 137 Colo. 169, 323 P.2d 614 (1958) (the "Bill of Rights" prevails); Deti
v. City of Durango, 136 Colo. 272, 316 P.2d 579 (1957) (lease constituted bn unconstitutional debt);
Kingsley v. City and County of Denver, 126 Colo. 194, 247 P.2d 805 (1952) (voting-machine acquisition case); McNichols v. City and County of Denver, 101 Colo. 316, 74 P.2d 99 (1937), involved the
purchase of lands with bond proceeds for Air Corps School and bombing field, in which case, at
page 330, 74 P.2d at 106, the court notes that the bonds were issued under the limitations of Colo.
Const., art. XI, J 8; Lord v. City and County of Denver, 58 Colo. 1, 143 Pac. 284 (1914) (constitutionality of the lending-of-creditprovisions); City and County of Denver v. Hallett, 34 Colo. 393, 83 Pac.
1066 (1905) (decided.before
6 of art. XX was added).
53 City of Canon City v. Merris, 137 Colo. 169, 323 P.2d 614 (1958).
54 See earlier cases which viewed similar questions from the standpoint of local and municipal
matter v. state-wide concern: McCormick v. City of Montrose, 105 Colo. 493, 99 P.2d 969 (1940);
Walker v. People, 55 Colo. 402, 135 Pac. 794 (1913); Keefe v. People, 37 Colo. 317, 87 Pac. 791 (1906).
55 In McCormick v. City of Montrose, 105 Colo. 493, 501, 99 P.2d 969, 973 (1940), an ordinance
making peddling a nuisance, in the absence of any statute on the subject, was held to be of local
concern only "at least until the state has seen fit to exercise its police Powers with reference to it."
56 Spears Clinic and Hospital v. State Board of Health, 122 Colo. 147, 22 P.2d 872 (1950); People
v. Newton, 106 Colo. 61, 101 P.2d 21 (1940); Denver v. Highlander Boy Foundation, 102 Colo. 365,
79 P.2d 361 (1938); Horst v. City and County of Denver, 101 Colo. 284, 73 P.2d 388 (1937); People
v. City and County of Denver, 90 Colo. 598, 10 P.2d 106 (1932); Armstrong v. Johnson Storage and
Moving Co., 84 Colo. 142, 268 Pac. 978 (1928); City and County of Denver v. Bossie, 83 Colo. 329,
266 Pac. 214 (1928).
57 People v. Mountain States Tel. & Tel. Co., 125 Colo. 167, 243 P.2d 397 (1952); Ray v. City and
County of Denver, 109 Colo. 74, 121 P.2d 886 (1942); People v. Graham, 107 Colo. 202, 110 P.2d 256
(1941). The first-cited case reversed a long line of decisions relating to utility regulation within
home-rule cities, the first of which was City and County of Denver v. Mountain States Tel. & Tel. Co.,
67 Colo. 225, 184 Pac. 604 (1919). See also Colo. Const., art. XXV, which was added Nov. 2, 1954.

JULY-AUGUST

DICTA

1960

known right-of-way case, City and County of Denver v. Henry,5
followed in Retallack. The court in Merris added questions of speed,
parking and designation of one-way streets. All of these, the opinion
said, are matters of purely local concern.
However, since the amendment of Section 6 in 1912, the court
has frequently and consistently invoked the so-called Hallett rule
that article XX was intended to confer not only the powers expressly mentioned, but to bestow upon the people of home-rule cities
every power possessed by the legislature in the making of a legislative charter therefor. As we have seen, it has on occasion gone
further and suggested that at least some pre-existing constitutional
provisions have no application. 9
VII. BASIC THEORIES OF HOME-RULE IN COLORADO
A charter is a municipality's organic law and is equivalent to a
state's constitution." The charter, like a state constitution and as
distinguished from the federal constitution, is not a grant of powei
but is a limitation thereon. 61
A home-rule city in Colorado has plenary power in a matter
which is solely of a local and a municipal nature, subject to the
limitations imposed by the state's admission act, the federal constitution and the state constitution. Nothing in the recent cases of
the Colorado
Supreme Court indicates any deviation from this
62
principle.
If, however, the matter is a state affair, the state has jurisdiction
to act,63 and in case of a conflict with municipal charter or ordin58 City and County of Denver v. Henry, 95 Colo. 582, 38 P.2d 895 (1934). This category might
be said to include the extraterritorial condemnation cases, i.e., Toll v. City and County of Denver,
340 P.2d 862 (Colo. 1959); City of Glendale v. City and County of Denver, 137 Colo. 188, 322 P.2d
1053 (1958); City and County of Denver v. Board of Comm'nrs, 113 Colo. 150, 155 P.2d 998 (1945);
Fishel v. City and County of Denver, 106 Colo. 576, 108 P.2d 236 (1940).
59 See cases cited in note 52, supra. Conceptually, it is not illogical for a court to hold that art.
XX supersedes earlier constitutional provisions by permitting a charter, or even an ordinance, to
supersede any constitutional provision adopted prior to the adoption of art. XX in any manner solely
of local and municipal concern. Similarly, any constitutional provision subsequently adopted can limit
the power of the people of a city so to supersede a constitutional provision in a local and municipal
matter.
60 Colo. Const. art. XX, 1 6. Flanders v. City of Pueblo, 114 Colo. 1, 160 P.2d 980 (1945); City
and County of Denver v. Board of Comm'nrs, 113 Colo. 150, 155 P.2d 998 (1945); McNichols v. City
and County of Denver, 101 Colo. 316, 74 P.2d 99 (1937).
61 City and County of Denver v. Sweet, 138 Colo. 41, 329 P.2d 441 (1958); Hawkins v. Hunt, 113
Colo. 468, 160 P.2d 357 (1945); Laverty v. Straub, 110 Colo. 311, 134 P.2d 208 (1943); People v.
Pickens, 91 Colo. 109, 12 P.2d 349 (1932).
62 Retallack v. Police Court of City of Colorado Springs, 351 P.2d 884 (Colo. 1960) (reckless
driving is a local affair regulated by ordinance); Burks v. City of Lafayette, 3.49 P.2d 692 (Colo.
1960) (charter can validly fail to restrict referendum in emergency in contravention of statute).
63 Spears Clinic and Hospital v. State Board of Health, 122 Colo. 147, 22 P.2d 872 (1950); Armstrong v. Johnson Storage and Moving Co., 84 Colo. 142, 268 Poc. 978 (1928); Walker v. People, 55
Colo. 402, 135 Pc,794 (1913).

* Commercial Printing
9 Catalogues and Brochures
* Year Books - Magazines

Expert
Brief Printers

THE

. Books-Book Binding
T House Organs

Gn
AI3ID

AM6-3277

PRESS

v2400
CURTIS STREET

Denver, Colorado

DICTA

JULY-AUGUST

1960

ance, the statute controls. 64 Authorities are agreed that, for example,
when a person is required by statute to do something in one manner and is required by ordinance to do the same thing in another
manner, there is a real conflict; and if a matter of state-wide concern, the state's statute should and does control. Such a conflict,
however, is not to be confused with the situation where an ordinance supplements or also regulates a particular subject without actually creating any real conflict.
Furthermore, the powers of a home-rule city can be limited by
the adoption of a constitutional
amendment subsequent to the
6
adoption of article XX.

5

VIII. CONCURRENT POWERS

The Colorado Supreme Court has recently enunciated and
developed the theme that if a matter is a state affair, i.e., is predominately of general interest, a municipality derives no authority
from article XX, and the city can exercise no power in the absence
of a consent of the state.0 6 The court does not indicate whether the
consent can be given by other than the state legislature or a quasilegislative body such as the State Highway Commission, as distinguished from executive officials and department heads. This
principle laid down by the court is all the more surprising in view
of the fact that the majority of jurisdictions concede that a municipality may have concurrent powers or jurisdiction with the state on
a matter which is of state-wide concern and in view of the court's
statement in Sweet that "we know
of no state with any broader
67
home-rule provisions than ours.
In the Merris case, the Colorado Supreme Court stated that
"application of state law or municipal ordinance, whichever pertains, is mutually exclusive."'6 It is submitted that this statement of
principle constitutes a revolutionary doctrine and a judicial amendment of article XX.
The court cites in support of this principle the Tihen case 69 and
the Keefe case. 70 The Tihen case based its statement
of this "mutu71
ally exclusive" principle upon the Mauff case.
The Merris case is ill-founded in its designated precedents. The
Keefe and Mauff cases were two of the several cases in the first
decade of home-rule which resulted in the amendment of Section 6,
article XX in 1912. The author of the Tihen case evidently did not
appreciate the fact that dissatisfaction with the "mutually exclusive" rule as enunciated by the Colorado Supreme Court in the ten
years following the adoption of article XX in 1902 i. e., a dissatisfaction with decisions that Denver could not legislate in any particular
field in which the matter in question was not solely of a local and
64 People ex rel. Public Utilities Comm'n v. Mountain States Tel. & Tel. Co., 125 Colo. 167, 243
P.2d 397 (1952); City and County of Denver v. Birdwell, 122 Colo. 520, 224 P.2d 217 (1950); Board
of Trustees v. People, 119 Colo. 301, 203 P.2d 490 (1949); Ray v. City and County of Denver, 109
Colo. 74, 121 P.2d 886 (1942). See also City of Colorado Sprinos v. Graham, 352 P.2d 273 (Colo.
1960); Welch v. City and County of Denver, 349 P.2d 352 (Colo. 1960).
65 Geer v. Rabinoff, 138 Colo. 8, 328 P.2d 375 (1958).
66 City and County of Denver v. Pike, 342 P.2d 688 (Colo. 1959); Davis v. City and County of
Denver, 342 P.2d 674 (Colo. 1959); City of Canon City v. Merris, 137 Colo. 169, 323 P.2d 620 (1958).
67 City and County of Denver v. Sweet, 138 Colo. 41, 329 P.2d 441 (1958). See text at note 73,
infro.
68 City of Canon City v. Merris, 137 Colo. 169, 180, 323 P.2d 614, 620 (1958).
69 City and County of Denver v. Tihen, 77 Colo. 212, 235 Pac. 777 (1925). See text note at 49,
supro.
70 Keefe v. People, 37 Colo. 317, 87 Pac. 791 (1906).
71 Mauff v. People, 52 Colo. 562, 123 Pac. 101 (1912).
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municipal nature but was also of state-wide concern, resulted 72in the
1912 amendment for the purpose of modifying that principle.
Furthermore, the court is going to find itself on the horns of a
dilemma if it adheres to the "mutually exclusive" principle. Section
6, article XX delineates a number of areas in which a home-rule city
has power to act. For example, Section 6 specifically provides that
a home-rule city has the "power to legislate upon, provide, regulate,
conduct and control ... the levy and collection of taxes and special
assessments . . . to be made by municipal officers or by the city or

state officers as may be provided by charter." Particularly in view of
the court's restrictive views as to what constitutes a matter which is
solely of local and municipal concern, any holding by it that the
charter provisions requiring the collection of special assessments at
a given time in a designated manner by a county treasurer is not
a state matter would be strained. The court's alternatives are to
ignore or "to construe away" this language in the constitution, to
make substantially illogical distinctions among its decisions as to
what constitutes a matter solely of local and municipal concern and
what constitutes a matter also of state-wide concern, or to abandon
the principle in question and to hold that that state and a homerule city can have concurrent jurisdiction concerning the same subject matter. Other specific provisions in Section 6 will result in
similar dilemmas for the court if it continues to adhere to the
"mutually exclusive" principle.
There actually is no sound objection to a doctrine of concurrent
jurisdiction in the absence73 of an actual conflict. The "better and
majority" view permits it.

No persuasive reason is suggested as to why, in the criminal
field, for example, a miscreant should be protected from municipal
regulation for a wrong committed within a home-rule city because
the state has concurrent jurisdiction and has made the act in
72 In Davis v. City and County of Denver,

342 P.2d 674, 686 (Colo.

1959), the specially concurring

opinion states that the majority opinion "indicates a retrogression to principles enunciated prior to
our decision in the case of City of Canon City v. Merris." The mplication is surprising from the
statement that the court should ignore a constitutional amendment and return to a principle existing
prior to its modification by the 1912 amendment merely because the court feels the former principle
is preferable. As an example of a case indicating that a home-rule city has concurrent powers with
the state in the absence of a conflict in a matter of state-wide concern see Ray v. City and County
of Denver, 109 Colo. 74, 121 P.2d 886 (1942). The decision of the majority is difficult to reconcile
with In re Senate Bill No. 72, 339 P.2d 501 (Colo. 1959), in which the legislature attempted to "consent", i.e., to authorize a home-rule city to legislate in an area of state concern. The court surprisingly held that the statute was an unconstitutional delegation of legislative power.

73 1 Antieau, Municipal Corporation Law §. 5.20-.21 (1958). See also Scott, Municipal Penal Ordinances in Colorado, 30 Rocky Mt. L. Rev. 267, 283 (1958); Comment, Conflicts between State Sfatufes and Municipal Ordinances, 72 Harv. L, Rev. 737 (1959).
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question a crime. In a highly urban area, regulation solely by state
officers or pursuant to state statutes may not afford the protection
to which the inhabitants of the city are entitled. The fact that both
the state and the city delineate a series of "do nots" does not impose
any real conflict. Any person can easily comply with the less restrictive limitations by complying with the more restrictive limitations, be they imposed by statute or ordinance. Any suggestion of
"double jeopardy" is a corruption of the intent and purpose of that
constitutional prohibition.
In the financial field, the "mutually exclusive" doctrine, if it
be extended to its logical extreme, would render a municipality
more or less powerless to raise the revenues which are essential
to its continued existence and effective operation in the public interest. Such holdings would render largely nugatory any doctrine of
home- rule powers. Manifestly, if all tax measures are of state-wide
concern, the legislature, "by pulling the purse strings," can effectively control home-rule municipalities and make them largely dependent upon the state.
IX.

PREEMPTION

In the Sweet case, 74 the Colorado Supreme Court held that Denver had no power to levy an income tax, because after the adoption
of article XX, i.e., in 1936, the constitution was amended by the addition of Section 17, article X, which reads: "The general assembly
may levy income taxes, either graduated or proportional, or both
graduated and proportional, for the support of the state, or any political subdivision thereof, or for public schools, and may, in the
administration of an income tax law, provide for special classified
or limited taxation
7 5 or the exemption of tangible and intangible personal property.
The court alluded to the "mutually exclusive" principle discussed
above, and then held that "Section 17 preempted the field of income
taxation for the general assembly" by the section's adoption.
The court states no reason why it feels the adoption of Section
17 preempted the income tax field unless the "reason" be the statement that Section 17 "says that the general assembly may levy this
tax, thus making it solely a matter of state-wide concern." This,
it is submitted, is merely a conclusion, not a reason.
As the court noted Section 7, article X, Colorado Constitution,
provides in part that the "general assembly shall not impose taxes
for the purpose of any county, city, town or other municipal corporation." Section 6, article X, provides that "All laws exempting from
taxation, property other than that hereinbefore mentioned shall be
void." Section 17 was adopted to avoid or limit the application of the
constitutional limitations in Section 6 and 7, and perhaps others, to
the field of income taxation. 76 Nothing in the language of the constitution itself, nor in the history concerning the adoption of Section
17, article X, suggests that an "exclusive jurisdiction" nor a "preemption" was intended by the state in relation to the powers of a homerule city. The state was merely adopting a constitutional provision
which would enable it to adopt a graduated income tax law to
74 City and County of Denver v. Sweet, 138 Colo. 41, 329 P.2d 441 (1958).
75 Colo. Const., art. X, § 17.
76 City and County of Denver v. Tax Research Bureau, 101 Colo. 140, 71 P.2d 809 (1937).
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solve its financial woes. It is quite another matter to find that the
state thereby intended to preempt the income tax field and prevent
a municipality from levying a similar tax.
Double taxation is commonplace. The federal government, any
state, and its subdivisions, must raise revenues by taxation in order
to defray the costs of necessary funds. Overlapping taxes are almost inevitable, and historically have been quite common, at least
in the field of general (ad valorem) taxes.
Those decisions which have held that a state legislature has
preempted an income tax field by the adoption of a state tax law
of a certain type have been extensively criticized. "The preemption
doctrine is not realistic; it is not sensitive to the fact that all taxes
are imposed on people and that government simply varies the incident by its choices of tax subjects and measures." 7
Another author, skilled in the field of municipal law, states:
The occupation of the field doctrine should be discarded. If the matter is a general one in a home-rule state, or
any kind elsewhere, the legislature can prevent further
municipal regulations by simply indicating its wish. In the
absence of such specific indication of the legislative intent
the judiciary would be well advised to avoid invalidating
municipal ordinances upon inquiries into the legislative
psyche. The doctrine may provide a too handy prop for invalidating municipal rules with which jurists are unsympathetic. One cannot help but notice how avidly courts in77 Fordham and Mollison, Local Incofre Taxation, 11 Ohio St. L.J.217,_223 (1950).
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validate municipal regulations in one 'field' on the theory
that it has been occupied, while condoning considerable
complementary regulation in another. Since it is practically
impossible for either municipal attorney or private counsellor to determine in advance what is the 'field' and to
forecast whether one has been 'occupied' the doctrine is unserviceable to the bar. 8
Nevertheless, a legislature can relatively easily correct any
misconstruction of a tax act by the courts by adopting an amendatory act specifically stating that preemption is not intended.
In the case of a court finding a "constitutional preemption," a
greater dis-service is done, because it is relatively difficult to correct
any court's misconstruction of preemption by the adoption of a
constitutional amendment. 9 There is little reason why a state and
a home-rule city should not have concurrent jurisdiction to levy and
collect the same type of tax. Each political subdivision, as well as the
state, should be responsible for raising the revenue which it needs
for its operation and should have the power so to do on an equitable
basis in the absence of an actual conflict between statute and
ordinance.
Thus, a court should be extremely reluctant to find that a state
statute, let alone a constitutional provision, has preempted a tax
field for the state in the absence of specific language clearly indicating an intent to preempt.
X. SUMMARY
The Colorado Supreme Court should re-examine its recent and
revolutionary cases in the field of home-rule powers and the
"mutually exclusive" and "preemption" doctrines recently enunciated. Any extension of those doctrines, coupled with a restrictive approach as to matters which constitute an affair solely of local and
municipal concern, will gradually erode the substantive powers of a
home-rule municipality until it is largely dependent upon the state
legislature and until the theory of home-rule power effected by the
adoption of article XX has been substantially modified by judicial
construction.
The disruption resulting from the recent cases is already a matter of common knowledge. State police officials and courts are overburdened in enforcing state statutes in the criminal field where
previously regulation was effected primarily in the municipal courts
by municipal police officials, particularly in the case of relatively
minor offenses. The need for additional revenues of municipal corporations in heavily populated urban areas experiencing rapid
growth is a matter of common knowledge. It is not in the public
interest to whittle away a municipality's power of taxation by judicial decision under such circumstances. Indeed, it is difficult to imagine any field of taxation in which the court might not hold that the
field has been preempted leaving the municipality without the
power to levy that type of tax. In the case of constitutional preemption, there can be no redress to the legislature.
78 1 Antieau, Municipal Corporation Law § 5.22 (1958).
79 Hartman, Municipal Income Taxation, 31 Rocky Mt. L. Rev. 123, 146 11959).

